http://confocal-microscopy-list.275.s1.nabble.com/Password-Strength-tp6673797p6677731.html
I did think of a downside to my suggestion of limiting log on attempts to one every second, 5 sec or whatever. If the the hacker did try a brute force attack, I suspect it would tie-up the server for as long as it went on. This would mean no one could get on as long as the hack continued. Of course, possibly the hack attack could recognize the inefficiency of continuing with logons limited say to every 5 sec and would move onto more fertile ground.
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> On 8/11/2011 11:29 AM, Tao Tong wrote:
>
>> But "correct horse battery staple" are composed of all common dictionary
>> words, and it is not immune to dictionary attack. co01ho02ba03st04 is a
>> little better.
>>
>> Better still, from a phrase like this:
>>
>> Go ahead, make my day.
>>
>> you get gammd from the first letters from each word, then throw in some
>> variations, such as gAmmD0809
>>
>> Shoud be much better, easy to remember, hard to crack.
>
> If we consider a 9 character password and assume that the characters can be one of 128 ASCII characters, we get a total of (128)^9 possible combinations, or 9.2 x 10^18.
>
> If we assume that English contains 50,000 "common" words that a dictionary would need to contain (--I think that would be a conservative estimate, since English has a total vocabulary of about 250,000 words and capitalizations, proper names, etc would all need to be considered) and limit our password to 4 words, we would get 6.3 x 10^18--i.e. almost the same.
>
> My sense is that the "four-words" strategy would probably work, as long as the resulting password were reasonably long and word order were truly random (i.e., not "big dog bit me").
>
> From what others have observed, it sounds as if the real place tackle password security is on the server: to limit logon attempts to one every 5 seconds or so--short enough not to drive users nuts but long enough to hamper brute-force attacks.
>
> Martin
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